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Abstract—Directed Acyclic Graph (DAG) based Distributed
Ledgers can be useful in a number of applications in the IoT
domain. A distributed ledger should serve as an immutable and
irreversible record of transactions, however, a DAG structure is a
more complicated mathematical object than its blockchain coun-
terparts, and as a result, providing guarantees of immutability
and irreversibility is more involved. In this paper, we analyse a
commonly discussed attack scenario known as a parasite chain
attack for the IOTA Foundation’s DAG based ledger. We analyse
the efficacy of IOTA’s core MCMC algorithm using a matrix
model and present an extension which improves the ledger’s
resistance to these attacks.
I. INTRODUCTION
Distributed Ledger has attracted a great deal of
attention in recent years, initially as a peer-to-peer
electronic cash system [1], but more recently,
distributed ledgers have been applied to problems
in the IoT domain, as discussed in detail in
[2]. Not all distributed ledgers are suited to IoT
applications: often the necessity of transaction fees
and the manner in which low value transactions are
dealt with makes some DLTs unsuitable. We are
particularly interesting in DLTs based on Directed
Acyclic Graphs (DAGs) in this work, and more
specifically, one DAG based ledger known as the
IOTA Tangle [3] which seems to posess properties
that make it suitable for the use-cases of interest.
The security of distributed ledgers is still much
disputed—the immutability and irreversibility of
the ledger rely on cryptographic hashing and
the consensus protocols built around this, but
guarantees are generally probabilistic and subject
to many network conditions being met [4]–[7].
In this paper, we analyse a commonly discussed
attack scenario known as a parasite chain attack
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which aims to reverse a transaction that has been
accepted by the network and spend the same coin
again. We analyse this attack in the context of the
IOTA Tangle and investigate the efficacy of IOTA’s
core algorithm using an explicit model and present
an extension of the algorithm which improves the
ledger’s resistance to these attacks.
In Section II we describe the Tangle DAG in detail
and introduce a double spending mechanism known
as a parasite chain attack. Section III begins with
the stochastic model for the Tangle presented in
[2]. We extend this model by providing an explicit
formulation for the Markov Chain Monte Carlo
(MCMC) tip selection algorithm and use this model
to simulate the algorithm’s resistance to parasite
chain attacks. Section IV introduces a modification
to the MCMC which makes use of the growth of the
cumulative weight in the Tangle and we present the
corresponding results for a parasite chain attack.
II. THE TANGLE
In this paper we expand upon the description of
the Tangle given in [2]. Recall that the Tangle is
a DAG-based DLT in which every new transaction
validates m previous transactions using a Proof
of Work (PoW) mechanism. In what follows we
use interchangeably the terms site, transaction and
vertex. All yet unapproved sites are called tips and
the set of all unapproved transactions is called the
tips set. Each validation is represented by an edge
of the graph, where a directed edge from site i to
site j means that i directly approves j. If there is
a directed path (but not a single edge) from i to
j we say that j is indirectly approved by i (e.g.,
see Figure 1). The core metric we employ in this
paper, to protect the Tangle against attacks, is the
cumulative weight H(t) of a transaction: this value
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2represents the total number of vertices that approve,
directly or indirectly, a given site. Figure 2 shows
an example of how the cumulative weight changes
in time. In what follows, we assume that there is
a simple way to verify whether the tips selected
for approval by a new transaction are consistent
with each other and with all the sites directly
or indirectly approved by them (this verification
occurs during the approval step). If verification
fails, the selection process must be re-run until a set
of consistent transactions is found. This consistency
property is needed in order to prevent malicious
users from tampering with the ledger by means of
a double spending attack.
Let us consider an example to develop this idea
further: Figure 3 shows a further instance of the
Tangle. A malicious user sent a certain amount of
money to a merchant. The corresponding transac-
tion is the yellow block in the figure. The same
user, afterwards, makes other transactions trying to
double spend the same money that were sent to the
merchant. These correspond to the green blocks. It
is worth stressing, at this point, that there is no
mechanism to force a user to select certain sites
for confirmation. Any transaction can be selected
as long as it is consistent with the sites that are
approved (directly or indirectly) by it. Nevertheless
it is reasonable to assume that the vast majority of
nodes would have little interest in confirming spe-
cific transactions and would follow the tips selection
algorithm proposed by the protocol. In this scenario,
all the transactions that approve the original yellow
site (the blue blocks) are incompatible with the
green ones, therefore any new transactions can either
approve the green/black sites or the blue/black ones.
The green/blue combination would be considered
invalid (as there is an inconsistency in the ledger)
and a new selection would be made. The objective
of an hypothetical attacker would be then to wait
for the merchant to accept their payment, receive
their goods, then create one or more double spending
transactions that get approved by other honest sites.
The success probability of such an attack depends
on the particular tip selection algorithm employed.
So far two Selection algorithms have been proposed:
• Uniform Random Tip Selection: The Uniform
Random Tip Selection (URTS) algorithm
selects m (generally two) tips randomly from
the pool of all possible tips. This algorithm,
due to its simplicity, makes the Tangle
vulnerable to double spending attacks. The
upper panel of Figure 4 shows an example of
the random selection procedure. The interested
reader can refer to [3] for a detailed discussion
on this topic.
• Markov Chain Monte Carlo Algorithm: The
Markov Chain Monte Carlo (MCMC) tip
selection algorithm works in a slightly more
elaborate way than its random counterpart.
In the MCMC algorithm m (generally two)
independent random walks are created on
the tangle; the walks start at the genesis
transaction and move along the edges of
the graph. The jumping probability from
transaction j to transaction k is proportional
to f(−α(Hj−Hk)), where f(·) is a monotonic
increasing function (generally an exponential),
α is a positive constant and Hi represents
the Cumulative Weight of transaction i. The
jumping process stops when the particle
reaches a tip, which is then selected for
approval. The lower panel of Figure 4 shows
an example of the paths of two walks in
this selection procedure. The main difference
with the RS algorithm lies in the use of the
graph structure: an attacker would need to
create enough transactions, with cumulative
weights equal to or larger than the cumulative
weight of the main DAG, in order to make
the double spending successful. This, in turn,
would require the malicious user to possess an
amount of computational power comparable
to the network of honest users. The interested
reader can find more details on this topic in [3].
The goal of the MCMC algorithm is to increase
(and ultimately ensure) the security of the Tangle
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Fig. 1. Transaction 8 directly approves 5 and 6. It indirectly approves 1, 2
and 3. It does not approve 4 and 7.
against double spending attacks performed by ma-
licious users. The algorithm and its security from
attacks can be tuned using the parameter α: high
values of α increase the probability that the parti-
cle will jump to the transactions with the largest
available cumulative weight (as α approaches ∞
the particles will move in a deterministic way),
whereas lower values of α make the algorithm and
its output more unpredictable (as the cumulative
weights matter less and the jumping probability
tends to become uniform as α approaches zero). A
good way of picturing the effects of this parameter
is by comparing it to the inverse temperature of a
gas: the smaller the value of α the warmer the gas
and vice-versa.
A. The Parasite Chain Attack
To see how in practice an hypothetical attacker
could carry out a double spending in the Tangle,
consider the attack scenario known as Parasite
Chain Attack. A Simple Parasite Chain (SPC)
is illustrated in Figure 5: we refer to this as
kth-order SPC because the first k transactions in
the chain reference the main Tangle. The attacker
publishes the green transaction in the Tangle and
simultaneously, in secret, creates a second spend of
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Fig. 2. Representation of the evolution of the Cumulative weight of three
sites as three new transactions enter the Tangle
Fig. 3. The blue and the green transactions are incompatible with each other.
the same coin with the yellow transaction followed
by a chain of transactions which validate it—the
parasite chain. The attacker waits for the green
transaction to be confirmed, and the goods to
be delivered, and then immediately broadcasts
the parasite chain to the network and continues
publishing transactions which validate it.
4Fig. 4. Representation of the two main tips selection algorithms: the upper panel shows an instance of the Random Selection algorithm whereas the lower one
presents a possible example of the Markov Chain Monte Carlo algorithm
An SPC can be charaterised by two parameters:
1) TDS is the time between the first spend of
the coin on the Tangle and the SPC being
broadcast;
2) k is the ‘order’ of the SPC i.e. the number of
transactions referencing the main Tangle
Note that it is possible to create parasite chains
with more complex structure to attack the Tangle.
Due to the complexity of the analysis, to the best of
our knowledge, it is not yet clear how a chain for
an optimal attack should be designed. Therefore, for
simplicity, we shall only consider the SPC in this
paper.
III. THE MONTE CARLO MARKOV CHAIN ALGORITHM
In this section we present a matrix model for
the MCMC algorithm which allows us to compute
1 2 k
Fig. 5. A kth-order SPC: The yellow and green transactions constitute a
double spend.
the probability that an MCMC random walk will
terminate on a given tip of a given instance of the
Tangle. We then use this model to simulate the effect
of the MCMC parameters in the event of a parasite
5chain attack.
A. Matrix Model
The Tangle is a growing family G(t) =
{V (t), E(t), t ≥ 0} with V (t) and E(t) being,
respectively, the set of vertices and the set of edges
of the graph. The evolution in time of the Tangle is
described by the following variables:
1) Li(t) is the number of tips of type i at time t,
so L(t) =
∑d
i=1 Li(t)
2) Wi(t) is the number of ‘pending’ tips of type
i at time t
3) Xi(t) = Li(t)−Wi(t) is the number of ‘free’
tips of type i at time t
4) Ta is the time when transaction a is created
5) τa ∈ {1, . . . , d} is the type of the transaction
a, after a valid selection has been made
6) Ni(t) is the number of transactions of type i
created up to time t
7) U(Ta) ∈ {0, 1, 2} is the number of free tips
selected for approval by transaction a at time
Ta
We have the relations
Ni(t) =
∑
a:Ta≤t, τa=i
1 (1)
Wi(t) =
∑
a:t−h<Ta≤t, τa=i
U(Ta) (2)
Xi(t) = Ni(t− h)−
∑
a:Ta≤t, τa=i
U(Ta) (3)
Li(t) = Ni(t− h)−
∑
a:Ta≤t−h, τa=i
U(Ta) (4)
The value of the variable U(t) depends on the
selection algorithm employed: while for the random
selection algorithm, U(t) depends only on the values
of Xi, Wi and Li, for all i just prior to time
Ta, for the Markov Chain Monte Carlo (MCMC)
algorithm the distribution of U(t) depends on the
whole graph (or a subset of it) G(t). Roughly
speaking the MCMC algorithm works as follows:
when a new transaction wants to approve a tip,
it generates a particle that starts somewhere deep
in the graph. This particle jumps randomly from
one transaction to another with a probability that is
proportional to the difference in cumulative weight
between transactions. The process stops when the
particle reaches a tip which is going to be selected
for approval. Thus, to model the MCMC algorithm
and characterize the distribution of U(t), we need
to define explicitly the cumulative weight of each
transaction and find an expression to describe the
behaviour of the particle.
The cumulative weight Hi(t) of transaction i is
defined as the number of transactions that directly
or indirectly reference it, at time t,
Hi(t) = #{z ∈ V (t) : z references i}. (5)
The weight Hi(t) can be computed using the
adjacency matrix M(t) of the DAG, and noting
that [Mk(t)]ij represents the number of paths that
connect transaction i and transaction j in k steps. In
what follows, we assume that if transaction i arrived
at time ti > tj , then j > i. Furthermore, define D(t)
as the diameter of the Tangle at time t (notice that
D(t) represents the longest path that connects two
vertices) and define
P (t) =
D(t)∑
k=1
Mk(t). (6)
Then Hi(t) is equal to
Hi(t) = µi +
N(t)∑
j=i+1
min{eiTP (t)ej, 1}µj, (7)
where µi is the individual weight of transaction i
and ei is the i-th vector of the canonical orthonormal
basis. Notice that we use min{·, 1} in order to avoid
counting the same transaction more than once (since
there could be several paths with a different number
of steps connecting two transactions).
Given (7), we can go back to the MCMC algo-
rithm: in the most general case, the particle starts
in a random site and we can define pi as the vector,
whose i-th entry represents the probability that the
particle starts at transaction i. Furthermore define the
difference in cumulative weight between transaction
j and transaction k to be ϑjk(t) = Hj(t) − Hk(t).
6Then the transition matrix T (t) whose jk entry
characterizes the probability of transitioning from
from site j to site k is defined as follows:
[T ]jk(t) =

q/m if k ∈ Oj
(1− q) e
−αϑjk(t)∑
z∈Ij e
−αϑjz(t) if k ∈ Ij
0 otherwise
(8)
where q ∈ [0, 1/2) represents the probability of
going backwards, m is the number of sites directly
referenced by j, Oj ⊂ V is the set of all sites that
are directly referenced by j, Ij ⊂ V is the set of
all sites that directly reference j and α is a tuning
parameter. Clearly, when the particle hits a tip, it
remains there indefinitely, therefore we can assume
that if transaction j is a tip,
[T ]jk(t) =
{
1 if j = k
0 otherwise.
(9)
Equations (8) and (9) provide us with useful
information on the MCMC algorithm: the Markov
chain has in fact N(t) − L(t) transition states and
L(t) absorbing states, where N(t) = |V (t)| is the
number of nodes in the tangle at time t. Therefore,
by re-labelling the states at each step the transition
matrix can be displayed as follows:
T (t) =
(
Q(t) R(t)
0 I
)
where Q(t) is the transition matrix between
transient states, R(t) is the transition matrix from
transient states to absorbing states, and I is the
identity matrix for the absorbing states of the
Markov Chain. Furthermore, we define Li, Xi to be
the sets containing the indices of the tips and free
tips of type i respectively, and define the absorbing
probability matrix B = (I −Q)−1R.
Using standard results for absorbing Markov
chains we can express the probability for the random
walk to terminate at a tip of type i (i.e., to be
absorbed by the subset Li of the absorbing states)
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Fig. 6. Convergence of MCMC monte carlo simulation results to matrix
model formula
as
pi(t) =
∑
j∈Li(t) pi
TBej∑d
k=1[
∑
l∈Lk(t) pi
TBel]
(10)
and then the probability for a new transaction a to
join the tip set of type i is
P (τa = i) = pi(t)
m
(
d∑
j=1
pj(t)
m
)−1
(11)
(the second factor on the right side of (11) accounts
for the requirement that all m selections must have
the same type). Note that this model assumes that m
independent random walks will be repeated until m
tips of the same type are chosen, which differs from
the IOTA Reference Implementation1 at the time of
writing, in which the first walk selects a reference
tip and determines τa i.e. P (τa = i) = pi(t).
This model was validated by generating a random
tangle with two branches, one of type 1, and the
other of type 2. We see that when we run a large
number of monte carlo simulations, counting the
number of times the MCMC walk terminates at each
type of tip, the calculated probability distribution
converges to the value obtained by (10). This is
illustrated in Figure 6.
For m = 2 the conditional distribution of U(t)
can be characterized as follows:
1https://github.com/iotaledger/iri
7P (U(Ta) = 2|τa = i) =
∑
j∈Xi(t)
piTBej(
∑
l∈Xi(t),l 6=j pi
TBel)
(
∑
k∈Li(t) pi
TBek)2
P (U(Ta) = 0|τa = i) =
(
1−
∑
j∈Xi(t) pi
TBej∑
k∈Li pi
TBek
)2
P (U(Ta) = 1) = 1− P (U(Ta) = 0|τa = i)−
−P (U(Ta) = 2|τa = i)
This provides all the necessary equations to char-
acterize the behaviour of the Tangle with the MCMC
algorithm.
B. Resistance to Parasite Chain Attacks
We now investigate how the parameters of an
SPC attack and the MCMC algorithm will affect
the likelihood of an MCMC walk terminating on an
SPC tip. For an SPC attack to succeed, a majority
of newly arriving transactions must validate tips
on the SPC—we do not seek to calculate the
probability of this event: for now, we compute the
probability of a single MCMC walk selecting a tip
of the SPC.
We denote tips on the main Tangle (which refer-
ence the first of the double spend transactions) as
type 1, and tips on the SPC as type 2. Then (11)
gives us:
p2(t) =
∑
j∈L2(t) pi
TBej∑
l∈L1(t) pi
TBel +
∑
j∈L2(t) pi
TBej
(12)
We simulate this probability for a randomly
generated instance of the Tangle and a first order
SPC with TDS of 120 seconds where the attacker
has 25% of the computing power of the network.
Results are shown in Figure 7.
Nex, we investigate the effect of the double
spend time, TDS . The attacker must wait at least
until the first transaction is confirmed and accepted
by the merchant before broadcasting the SPC
containing the second spend. We assume here that
this confirmation will require at least 2 minutes,
corresponding to the results in Figure 7, but
Figure 8 illustrates the effect of waiting longer
to broadcast the SPC. The reason for the evident
decrease in probability of selecting an SPC tip is
related to how the cumulative weight of transactions
grow in the Tangle. Because of the width of the
Tangle, there is an adaptation period before all
new arriving transactions will indirectly approve a
site and increase its cumulative weight. However,
the parasite chain is only one tip wide and hence,
the cumulative weight of transactions on the chain
will immediately grow at the rate of arrival of
the attacker’s transactions, µ. This phenomenon
is illustrated in Figure 9 which plots the average
cumulative weight trajectory of 100 transactions.
The intersection point on these plots indicates that
the probability of selecting an SPC tip should
be very high if the SPC is broadcast after only
a minute, and this is confirmed by simulation
as illustrated in Figure 10 (note that the first
transaction would most likely not be confirmed by
this time so this may be pointless for the attacker).
The other key parameter of the SPC is the order,
k. There are two factors at play for an attacker when
it comes to choosing k. The higher the choice of k,
the more likely the MCMC walk is to jump on to
the chain. However, more links to the main Tangle
also means more opportunities to jump back on to
the Tangle from the SPC. An interesting relationship
arises between the probability of selecting an SPC
tip, the attacker’s choice of k, and the MCMC
walk backstepping probability parameter q. This
relationship is illustrated in Figure 11.
IV. EXTENDING THE MCMC ALGORITHM
As described in the previous section, the MCMC
algorithm is, at its core, a biased random walk
whose transition probabilities depend on the
cumulative weights of the graph vertices. The
original motivation for using the MCMC selection
was to incentivise network users to validate recent
tips and defend the Tangle against attacks such
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Fig. 7. Probability of selecting an SPC tip: λ = 15, µ = 5, k = 1,
TDS = 120
0 0.005 0.01 0.015 0.02 0.025 0.03 0.035 0.04 0.045 0.05
0
0.005
0.01
0.015
0.02
0.025
0.03
Fig. 8. Probability of selecting an SPC tip: λ = 15, µ = 5, k = 1
0 60 120 180 240 300
0
500
1000
1500
2000
2500
3000
3500
4000
Main Tangle
Parasite Chain
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Fig. 11. Probability of selecting an SPC tip: λ = 15, µ = 5, α = 0.005,
TDS = 120
as the parasite-chain attack. The random walk is
biased towards the ’heaviest’ sub-DAG i.e. the
sub-DAG with highest cumulative weight, and the
aim of the attacker who wishes to double spend is
to create a sub-DAG in secret quicker than the rest
of the network’s honest users so that when they
publish it, the MCMC walks will tend to choose
their new, heavier sub-DAG.
Theoretically, if the MCMC parameter α is
high enough and if the attacker does not possess
hashing power greater than the rest of the network
combined, then the attack should never succeed.
However an excessively high value of α would
essentially result in the Tangle becoming a chain,
and many transactions would be orphaned. The
design trade-off between security and liveness
involved in choosing α is discussed in [9], and
solutions to the issue of transactions being orphaned
are proposed in [8].
We now propose a modification to the MCMC
algorithm which seeks to reduce the efficacy of
double spending attacks whilst allowing us to main-
tain a low α, and hence a wide Tangle and low
probability of orphaned transactions. The intuition
for our modification stems from the phenomenon
illustrated in Figure 9: Although the cumulative
weight of a transaction on the main Tangle may
lag behind due to the initial adaptation period it
underwent, we can be quite sure that at the point of
attachment of a parasite chain, deep in the Tangle,
the rate of growth of the cumulative weight of
transactions should be equal to λ. Our modification
9utilises the first order time derivative of the cumula-
tive weight in calculating the jumping probabilities
of the MCMC walk—we use a First Order MCMC.
Define ϑ(1)jk (t) = |H′j(t) − H′k(t)|, where H′k(t) is
the time derivative of the cumulative weight, Hk(t):
[T ]jk(t) = (13)
=

q/m if k ∈ Oj
(1− q) e
−αϑjk(t)−βϑ(1)jk (t)∑
z∈Ij e
−αϑjz(t)−βϑ(1)jz (t)
if k ∈ Ij
0 otherwise
where β is a positive tuning parameter.
A. Resistance to Parasite Chain Attacks
The cumulative weight of a transaction in a
parasite chain grows linearly with rate equal to
the computing power of the attacker, µ, whilst
the main Tangle will grow at the rate of the
hashing power of the rest of the network, λ, as
illustrated in Figure 9. Therefore, the parasite chain
will be heavily penalized by the First Order MCMC.
Simulation results for the same instance of the
Tangle used for examples in Section III are shown
in Figure 12.
These preliminary results suggest that the First
Order MCMC achieves its goal. Of course, this
algorithm performance will start to deteriorate when
the particle approaches a tip, as at this height, the
cumulative weight on the main Tangle grows at a
different rate. Therefore, it could be useful to modify
the derivative term adding a weight, dj that increases
with each forward jump (and decreases with every
backward jump). It would also be interesting to
investigate the effects of such a modification on
Nash equilibria and other game theoretic aspects in
the Tangle as discussed in [10].
V. CONCLUSIONS
In this paper we present a matrix model for the
MCMC tip selection algorithm. We use this model to
simulate the resistance of this algorithm to parasite
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Fig. 12. Probability of selecting an SPC tip: λ = 15, µ = 5, k = 1,
TDS = 120
chains on a randomly generated Tangle for different
parameters of the attack and of the algorithm. We
then present an extension of the MCMC algorithm
to utilise the first order time derivative of cumulative
weight, and accordingly, we demonstrate its effec-
tiveness at mitigating parasite chain attacks over its
predecessor.
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